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whether episodic memory might show some functional adapta-
tion to facilitate commitment. Specifically, might there be a pro-
pensity for stronger encoding of or retention of episodic
memories that are commitment related? This could be tested –
following a procedure developed by Conway (2009; cf. Williams
et al. 2008) – by asking people to list as many specific memories
as possible for yesterday, two days ago, three days ago, and so on,
and measuring the frequency of memories in which social com-
mitments are generated. In order to determine whether there is
commitment-specific facilitation, it would be important to
compare the effects of commitment on memory with other
factors such as generalized personal or social significance.
Should commitment-specific facilitation be found, the further
question would be whether this is an evolutionary adaptation,
and it would be important to rule out alternative explanations
such as enculturation operating on developmental plasticity. It
is in general challenging to infer back from current function to
evolutionary adaptation, and especially so in the case of multi-
functional traits.
With this cautionary note in mind, we may venture to observe
that Conway’s theory of episodic memory also raises interesting
considerations for understanding the origins of commitment in
human evolution. Conway’s hypothesis is that the function of epi-
sodic memory is to maintain a record of progress in relation to
short-term goals (Conway 2009). In this respect, it is important
to note that active working memory has limited capacity, which
means that over the course of temporally extended goal-directed
activities, task-related information must be stored and retrieved
from long-term memory (LTM). There are compelling reasons
to think that the form of LTM involved is episodic memory
(self-involving) and not mere event memory (no self present).
After all, Alan must be aware that X is his goal and that he has per-
formed a particular set of task-related actions up to this point.
Merely remembering that some agent was performing a task,
which the individual somehow egocentrically remembers, isn’t
enough to carry on with the task.
Complex, temporally extended goal-directed activities argu-
ably play an important adaptive role for a number of nonhuman
species, and clearly were extremely important in human evolu-
tion. This lends considerable plausibility to Conway’s theory.
More recently (in phylogenetic terms), human lifeways have
been shaped by the importance of coordinating with others
in joint goal-directed activities. It is therefore tempting,
against the backdrop of Conway’s theory, to speculate that epi-
sodic memory may have come to support the function of
keeping track of who is committed to what within the context
of joint goal-directed activities. Could such information be
encoded directly to semantic memory, bypassing episodic
memory? Possibly, but on Conway’s account, episodic
memory forms the basis for higher-order conceptual memory
structures (e.g., a conceptual frame like a day at work) that
provide narrative structure which organizes specific episodes.
Thus, according to Conway, episodic memory plays a founda-
tional role in the development of higher levels of narratively
structured memory.
Conway’s theory offers an attractive framework for under-
standing the evolution of social commitment and, in so doing,
provides an illuminating backdrop to M&C’s analysis. As M&C
point out, episodic memory is important in grounding social
commitments. This is surely true. It is also true that, to make a
commitment, you have to already be capable of engaging in tem-
porally extended goal-directed activity – otherwise there is
nothing to make a commitment about. Furthermore, the social
regulation of commitments (especially to the extent that the
commitment is implicit and/or indeterminate) is likely to
involve the detailed narrative memory for goal-directed activity
described by Conway’s theory.
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Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) view autonoesis as being essential to
episodic memories and construction as being essential to the process of
episodic remembering. These views imply that episodic memory is
systematically misleading, not because it often misinforms us about the
past, but rather because it often misinforms us about how it informs us
about the past.
Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that the function of episodic
memory is to enable a subject to persuade others to endorse the
subject’s descriptions of past events. Although the authors build
an impressive case for this communicative account, it turns out
to be committed to a counterintuitive claim, namely, that episodic
memory is systematically misleading. Other accounts, including
the future-oriented account (e.g., Schacter & Addis 2007), like-
wise turn out to be committed to this misleadingness claim. The
future-oriented account sees episodic memory, along with epi-
sodic future thought (Szpunar 2010), as a form of mental time
travel (MTT) (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997), with future-ori-
ented MTT or episodic future thought being primary, in the
sense that the function of the MTT system is to enable the
subject to imagine future events, while the ability to engage in
forms of past-oriented MTT, including episodic memory,
emerges as a by-product. Although they differ on the question
of the function of the memory or MTT system, the future-ori-
ented account and the communicative account agree on two
claims that together imply the misleadingness claim: (1) that epi-
sodic memories necessarily involve autonoesis (the autonoesis
claim) and (2) that episodic remembering is necessarily a con-
structive process (the construction claim).
The autonoesis claim: M&C understand autonoesis in metare-
presentational terms (cf. Dokic 2014; Fernández 2016), character-
izing the content of a retrieved memory as having two
components: a first-order component informing a subject about
an event and a second-order component informing him or her
that the information provided by the first-order component orig-
inates in the subject’s own experience of the event. If retrieved
memories are indeed metarepresentational, then, when retrieval
results in the formation of a belief, the subject believes not
simply that such-and-such an event occurred but rather that he
or she knows that such-and-such an event occurred because of
having experienced its occurrence. Crucially, the second-order
component of a memory belief might be inaccurate – and hence
the belief as a whole might be false – even if the first-order com-
ponent is accurate, simply because there are sources of accurate
information about an event other than one’s own experience.
The autonoesis claim is essential to the communicative account:
In making a memory claim, a subject claims epistemic authority
over the event in question, and autonoesis is normally the subject’s
only ground for doing so. The claim might not, strictly speaking,
be essential to the future-oriented account: Because autonoesis
may not play a role in episodic future thinking (Perrin 2016),
the future-oriented account might replace it with a weaker
claim, namely, that although autonoesis typically plays a role in
episodic remembering, it is not a necessary feature of retrieved
memories (Michaelian 2016b). Even this weakened claim is,
however, sufficient to commit the future-oriented account to
the misleadingness claim.
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The construction claim: M&C understand construction as occur-
ring through Bayesian prediction of features of past events based on
evidence provided by both episodic traces and semantic informa-
tion (De Brigard 2014a). Alternative understandings are available
(Michaelian 2016b), but they concur that, at least in typical cases,
not all of the content of a given retrieved memory originates in
the subject’s experience of the remembered event. This, in turn,
implies that retrieved memories will often be, to some degree, inac-
curate with respect to remembered events. But construction does
not make inaccuracy inevitable: The incorporation of nonexperien-
tial information into a retrieved memory representation, in particu-
lar, does not necessarily imply inaccuracy, simply because
incorporated information may itself be accurate (Michaelian 2013).
The construction claim is essential to the communicative
account: If the point of making memory claims is not to convey
accurate descriptions of past events but rather to convey descrip-
tions that the subject wants an audience to endorse, a constructive
memory process is needed to enable the subject to generate suit-
able representations of events. The claim is likewise essential to
the future-oriented account: TheMTT systemmust be able to con-
structively recombine andmodify information fromvarious sources
in order to generate representations of possible events in episodic
future thinking, and if episodic remembering is carried out by the
same system, it is bound to be constructive in the same sense.
The misleadingness claim: Together, the (weakened) autonoesis
claim and the construction claim imply the misleadingness claim.
If the autonoesis claim is right, a memory might be false even if
the event that it represents occurred exactly as the belief repre-
sents it as having occurred. In particular, the belief will be false
in cases in which its first-order content originates at least in part
in a source other than the subject’s own experience of the
event. If the construction claim is right, such cases occur fre-
quently. Indeed, because, as M&C acknowledge, episodic
remembering is driven as much by current beliefs as by episodic
traces, they are the rule rather than the exception. Therefore,
the second-order component of a memory belief – and the
belief as a whole –will frequently be false. In short, both the com-
municative account and the future-oriented account are commit-
ted to the claim that episodic memory beliefs are frequently false,
not because construction results in inaccurate representations of
events, but rather because autonoesis results in inaccurate meta-
representations of the relationship between representations and
the sources in which they originate, both where events are repre-
sented inaccurately and where they are represented accurately.
We might, in principle, attempt to avoid the misleadingness
claim by rejecting either the construction claim or the autonoesis
claim, but we have good reason to accept both of these claims. We
might also attempt to avoid it by modifying the metarepresenta-
tional understanding of autonoesis so that the autonoesis claim
says that the second-order component of a retrieved memory
informs a subject only that part of the first-order component of
the memory, as opposed to the first-order component as a
whole, originates in the subject’s experience of the event, but it
is unclear whether this is compatible with the roles assigned to
autonoesis by the communicative and future-oriented accounts.
We may thus be forced to accept the counterintuitive conclusion
that episodic memory is indeed systematically misleading.
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Abstract:Dissociative identity disorder is characterised by the presence in
one individual of two or more alternative personality states (alters). For
such individuals, the memory representation of a particular event can
have full episodic, autonoetic status for one alter, while having the status
of knowledge or even being inaccessible to a second alter. This
phenomenon appears to create difficulties for a purely representational
theory and is presented to Mahr & Csibra (M&C) for their consideration.
A good test of a framework is the way in which it handles rare
cases. The challenging example I wish to introduce for Mahr &
Csibra’s (M&C’s) consideration is that of the episodic memory
of individuals with dissociative identity disorder.
TheDiagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th
ed.; DSM-V) diagnostic category for dissociative identity disorder
(DID) has two main criteria:
A. Disruption of identity characterized by two or more distinct
personality states. …
B. Recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday events, important per-
sonal information, and for traumatic events that are inconsistentwith
ordinary forgetting. (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 292)
Other criteria include the ruling out of cultural factors and general
medical conditions. Any gap in the recall of everyday events is usually
filled by the recall of another personality state. Thus, detail of the
previous day’s activities might be traced by piecing together the
(non-overlapping) episodic recall of three or four alters.
With DID patients, then, the phenomenon of interest relates to
what one alternative personality state (alter) knows about what
happened to another alter. One experimental demonstration of
this involves an alter learning 24 nouns. A second alter, who
denies all knowledge of the preceding procedure, is taught a dif-
ferent set of nouns. A week later, without warning, the second
alter is brought out and asked to follow a recognition memory
test with the 48 stimuli together with distractors. Huntjens et al.
(2003; 2007) found that their DID subjects responded to the
words presented to the other alter as though they had previously
seen them, in spite of having no recollection of the presentation.
These authors conclude that “dissociators … seem to be charac-
terised by the belief of being unable to recall information
instead of an actual retrieval inability” (2007, p. 788, their
italics). This situation, where there is no phenomenal experience
of an event, but where the event is exerting a clear influence on
behaviour, matches the phenomenon of post-hypnotic amnesia
(e.g., Smith et al. 2013). Here, subjects claim no recollection of
recent experiences which, nonetheless, affect current behaviour.
Smith et al. (2013) have suggested that executive processes are
responsible for controlling the initial access to material and then
determine whether retrieved information is allowed into con-
sciousness. However, material that has been accessed will exert
some influence on processing even though it is not allowed into
consciousness. Morton (2017) gives a similar account for the
results of Huntjens et al. (2003; 2012) described above.
Using the same experimental procedure as Huntjens et al.
(2003), Morton (2012; 2017) found two individuals with DID
where one alter responded to the words that had been presented
to another alter in exactly the same way as they responded to the
control words. In other words, this material could not even be
accessed by the second alter despite being a full part of the first
alter’s phenomenal past.
Similar results have been shown with more complex material.
Reinders et al. (2003) studied DID patients who were in either
a trauma-related identity state or a neutral identity state. The
former generated an autobiographical traumatic memory that
the latter failed to recognise as relating to themselves. These
memories were contrasted to neutral memory scripts, which
both states accepted as autobiographical. The two scripts were
put into the third person and read in a neutral tone to the patients
while they were in a scanner. The scans were similar with the
neutral script for the two states, and there were only small differ-
ences between the scans of the two scripts for the neutral identity
state. The big difference occurred when the trauma-related state
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